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1NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                          
No. 07-4303
                          
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
    v.
LISA PHILLIP,
               Appellant
                            
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
District Court  No. 07-cr-00107
District Judge: The Honorable Edwin M. Kosik
                              
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
December 12, 2008
Before: MCKEE, SMITH, and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
(Filed: December 18, 2008)
                            
  OPINION
                           
SMITH, Circuit Judge.
On March 12, 2007, a one count information was filed in the United States District
    The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We exercise1
appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).
2
Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania charging Lisa Philip and Carl Johnson with
conspiring to defraud the United States in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371.  The information
alleged that Philip and Johnson, the father of her children, failed to report income
received while they were participating in a rental assistance program administration by
the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development.  The applications they
completed in order to participate in the program required that they report all income.  Yet
they failed to report either Johnson’s income, or the approximate “$500 per month in
rental income derived from a house owned in the name of [their] daughter.”  
During a thorough change of plea hearing, Philip pleaded guilty to the information.
She admitted she knew about both Johnson’s earnings and the rental income.  At
sentencing, the District Court imposed a two year period of probation and ordered that
Philip make restitution totalling $15,473.00.  
Philip appealed.   Philip’s defense counsel moved to withdraw pursuant to Anders1
v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).  In  Anders, the Supreme Court stated that the
“constitutional requirement of substantial equality and fair process” means that appellate
counsel must act as an advocate for the defendant.  386 U.S. at 744.  Thus, counsel’s 
role as advocate requires that he support his client’s appeal to the best of his
ability.  Of course, if counsel finds his case to be wholly frivolous, after a
conscientious examination of it, he should so advise the court and request
permission to withdraw.  That request must, however, be accompanied by a
3brief referring to anything in the record that might arguably support the
appeal.  
Id.  The Anders brief, as we explained in United States v. Youla, 241 F.3d 296, 300 (3d
Cir. 2001),  must demonstrate that counsel has “thoroughly examined the record in search
of appealable issues,” and it must “explain why the issues are frivolous.”  Accordingly,
our inquiry is twofold: (1) whether counsel adequately fulfilled the requirements of
Anders; and (2) “whether an independent review of the record presents any nonfrivolous
issues.”  Id. (citing United States v. Marvin, 211 F.3d 778, 780 (3d Cir. 2000)); see also
Anders, 386 U.S. at 744 (explaining that the court must proceed, “after a full examination
of all the proceedings, to decide whether the case is wholly frivolous”).
Philip’s counsel has identified the only bases for appeal in light of Philip’s guilty
plea: (1) an attack upon the validity of her guilty plea; and (2) a challenge to the
reasonableness of her probationary sentence.  See United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563,
570-75 (1989).  Counsel explained that the record supported the District Court’s finding
that she knowingly and voluntarily entered a plea of guilty.  In addition, counsel pointed
out that Philip admitted during the plea colloquy that she knew about the income earned
by Johnson and from the rental property when she completed the forms to participate in
the rental assistance program.  With regard to the reasonableness of her probationary
sentence, counsel asserts that she received the most lenient of sentences and that there is
no basis for her challenge.
We agree that these issues are frivolous.  The District Court’s plea colloquy
4complied with the mandates of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(b) and Boykin v.
Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969).  Inasmuch as Philip admitted she knew about the income
she failed to report, there is a factual basis for the plea of guilty.  Nor is there any basis
for disturbing the District Court’s probationary sentence, which was imposed after the
District Court considered the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).  
We recognize that Philip has taken advantage of the opportunity to file an informal
brief as permitted by our Local Appellate Rule 109.2(b).  She contests that there is
evidence to prove her guilt.  She also asserts that her counsel erred by failing to adduce
other evidence to support her innocence.  As we noted above, however, the guilty plea
colloquy established a factual basis for her plea, particularly in light of her
acknowledgment that the rental income “went into the household.”  
We conclude that counsel adequately fulfilled the requirements of Anders. 
Because our own independent review of the record fails to reveal any nonfrivolous issues
for appeal, we will grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm the judgment of the
District Court entered on October 29, 2007.  We certify that the issues presented in the
appeal lack legal merit and thus do not require the filing of a petition for writ of certiorari
with the Supreme Court.  3d Cir. LAR 109.2(b).
